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Abstract 
Attention in the mass media is seen as crucial for electoral success. However, most ordinary 
candidates hardly get any attention in the news. With social media outlets becoming ever-more 
popular, the question is whether the overall asymmetry in attention for candidates still holds today. 
Do candidates who dominate the traditional media during the campaign also dominate the social 
media? Or can candidates make up for a lack of mass media coverage by attracting attention on 
these new media platforms? This paper aims to answer these questions by paring Twitter activity and 
Twitter popularity with newspaper attention for a large number of individual candidates in the 2014 
Belgian election campaign. We expand the  normalization versus equalization debate by not only 
looking at how much a new medium is used, but also at its success in terms of popularity and 
audience reach. Our findings show that the two platforms are indeed related, mainly because a small 
political elite dominates both old and new media. Twitter popularity and Twitter activity (albeit to a 
lesser extent) are higher among powerful politicians. We elaborate on why these findings are so 
much in line with the normalization hypothesis.  
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Introduction  
Traditionally, election campaigns are won in the mass media. Candidates that can attract plenty of 
journalistic attention and appear most on television and in newspapers are mostly also those that 
perform well on Election Day. Candidates’ best bet, then, always used to be to aim for getting 
attention through these mass media outlets. However, studies in different contexts have shown that 
media attention is distributed highly unequally over politicians, meaning that most of them remain 
outside the media’s spotlights (Tresch, 2009; Wolfsfeld, 2011). The central query of this paper is 
whether this knowledge still holds to this day, when social media outlets are becoming ever more 
popular. Do social media provide a more equal playing field with more politicians getting a share of 
the attention? Or does it remain ‘politics as usual’, with social media having the same focus on a 
limited number of elite actors? These conflicting expectations reflect the so-called equalization and 
normalization hypotheses, respectively (Gibson & McAllister, 2014; Lilleker et al., 2011). While some 
scholars argue that social media create a more open and equal platform for politicians to reach out, 
others temper these positive expectations and stress that the new media are driven by the same 
dynamics that affected traditional news media.   
In this study, we test these conflicting assumptions using data from the 2014 Belgian election 
campaign. Rather than focusing on political parties, we direct our attention to individual politicians – 
and to their Twitter accounts in particular (see also Enli & Skogerbø, 2013; Hong & Nadler, 2012; 
Vergeer & Hermans, 2013). Here, the question is whether the normalization hypothesis holds for 
Twitter, or if there are indications that it is a separate platform that in contrast to traditional media 
focuses less on a handful of elite politicians. For a vast number of individual candidates, we compare 
their prevalence in traditional news media during the campaign with their performance on Twitter in 
this given period. We argue that the ‘normalization versus equalization’ dichotomy can not only be 
applied to political actors’ activity on Twitter, but also to how well these activities perform in terms 
of audience reach. In this way, we aim to contribute to the ongoing debate on how digital media 
affect political competition and power hierarchies. 
The paper is structured as follows. We first provide an overview of the literature about the role of old 
and new media in (personal) election campaigns and formulate competing hypotheses 
(normalization versus equalization). Departing from this review, we discuss how Twitter activity and 
popularity can be conceptualized using the affordances that this platform features. Next, we present 
our research design and the main results. Our findings show that the equalizing potential of Twitter is 
barely fulfilled. Although there a is more equal distribution with regard to Twitter activity of 
politicians, this does not translate to Twitter popularity, which’s distribution is nearly as skewed as 
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the traditional media. Those candidates who receive most mass media attention are generally also 
the ones who are most popular and successful in reaching out via Twitter. A small elite group of party 
leaders and ministers, in particular, succeeds in dominating both traditional and new media charts. 
These findings largely corroborate the normalization hypothesis. In contrast, we find little support for 
the equalization hypothesis as Twitter popularity and (to a lesser extent) Twitter activity are higher 
among more powerful politicians. We elaborate on possible explanations for these findings in the 
discussion section and suggest pathways for further research.  
Theory and hypotheses 
Election campaigns are a central topic of research in political communication, as their potential 
impact on knowledge, attitudes, and behaviour of voters is vast. The role of the mass media has 
always been a prominent aspect of these studies. Generally, mass media are considered as the key 
arena to reach out to voters and improve electoral support (e.g., Druckman, 2005; Hopmann, 
Vliegenthart, De Vreese, & Albæk, 2010; Norris, Curtice, Sanders, Scammell, & Semetko, 1999). The 
number of preferential votes, which can be considered as personal electoral capital, is positively 
correlated with the amount of media attention – also for lower-ranked candidates (Van Aelst, 
Maddens, Noppe, & Fiers, 2008). The scholarly focus on traditional mass media notwithstanding, 
over the last fifteen years the so-called new or digital media have gradually been included in 
theoretical models of campaigning (Norris, 2002; Foot & Schneider, 2006; Gibson & Cantijoch, 2011). 
This reflects the fact that parties and candidates now have the opportunity to reach out and interact 
with voters via websites, blogs and e-mail, effectively bypassing traditional mass media. More 
recently, scholarly attention has shifted to web campaigning 2.0, focusing on the role of social media 
(Gibson, Römmele, & Williamson, 2014; Jackson & Lilleker, 2009; Jungherr, 2016).  
Social media between normalization and equalization 
Ever since the introduction of new media in politics, the scholarly debate is characterized by a 
dispute between optimistic and more pessimistic views on the democratic opportunities of these 
new communication technologies (Dahlgren, 2005; Margolis & Resnick, 2000). Although studies often 
provided mixed or nuanced support for both viewpoints (Gibson & McAllister, 2014), the 
contradiction is still reflected in contemporary theoretical reflections on social media and politics. 
The normalization hypothesis suggests few changes in media dynamics and power structures, while 
the equalization hypothesis posits the opposite, expecting a more diverse range of actors and voices 
in public discourse. Therefore, the latter is sometimes labelled more generally as the ‘transformation 
thesis’ (Jungherr, 2014b) or ‘innovation hypothesis’ (Larsson, 2013), while normalization is often 
labelled ‘politics as usual’ (Gibson & Ward, 1998). The normalization versus equalization thesis is 
4 
 
traditionally used to study the online activities of political parties in election times. According to the 
equalization hypothesis, smaller parties can compensate for their lack of media attention by being 
more present and more innovative online. In contrast, the normalization hypothesis suggests that 
larger parties have more resources to deploy more professional engaging online activities, thereby 
re-establishing the existing hierarchy (Lilleker et al., 2011). In this respect, the focus has mainly been 
on the (quality of the) web performance of parties, and more recently also on individual politicians’ 
efficacy (e.g. Hong & Nadler, 2012; Mascheroni & Mattoni, 2012). However, we argue that social 
media allow to extend the normalization vs equalization debate from activity to the level of social 
media reach. By looking at the success of politicians’ social media presence, it becomes possible to 
add an ‘effect’ or audience component to the debate (see also Larsson & Moe, 2014). To put it 
differently, “who speaks” and “who gets heard” are two different questions (Hindeman, 2009; Hong 
& Nadler, 2016). Equalization would then imply that lower profile political actors, too, reach a 
considerable audience, while normalization would mean that only powerful actors, those who 
already receive a disproportionate amount of attention in traditional media, score high in terms of 
online audience reach. As indicators of power, we account for ballot list position and incumbency.  
In this study we try to contribute to the normalization-equalization literature by formulating 
competing hypotheses relating to different dimensions of this debate. In terms of activity, we expect 
politicians across the board to be fairly active on Twitter, certainly in election time. First, this is 
because politicians are not dependent on journalists to use this medium. With this in mind, Fenton 
(2012) even speaks of a “politics of non-representation”, as communication with the electorate can 
occur unmediated by traditional mass media. On Twitter, currently every published tweet appears in 
all timelines of people who follow its sender. Thus, compared to the traditional media, politicians are 
arguably more autonomous in their means of communication, which in turn can be translated into a 
lower dependency on the traditional gatekeepers. Second, the use of social media such as Twitter 
demands comparably few resources. Twitter use is free of costs, and producing these short messages 
requires little technical knowledge or time. This ease of use contrasts with the web 1.0 era, since 
building a personal website consumes more time and resources (Zittel, 2009), which also explained 
why minor parties often failed to use all interactive and mobilizing potential of their websites 
(Schweitzer, 2011). Therefore, as a fast, cheap and easy medium, Twitter could have a greater 
equalizing potential.  
Related to the audience reach of Twitter, results of previous studies are somewhat mixed, but lean 
mostly towards the normalization thesis. While the characteristics of social media may theoretically 
improve the potential of a more egalitarian political landscape, empirical evidence seems to temper 
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high expectations. For instance, Gerhards & Shäfer (2010) show that the online presence of actors 
that deal with one particular issue (human genome research) strongly resembled that of traditional 
media coverage in both the US and Germany. The recent study of Hong and Nadler (2016) shows that 
the online presence of interest groups is even more concentrated online than offline. In particular, a 
small group of large organizations with large online network (measured in terms of Twitter followers) 
is responsible for this unequal distribution of political voices. Studies about e-campaigning by 
political parties in the Web 2.0 era also seem to favour the normalization hypothesis, which entails 
that political actors who are already powerful offline tend to be much more successful in reaching a 
larger audience on social media as well (Klinger, 2013). Nonetheless, exceptions have been found, 
which provide alternative evidence for the role of Twitter and its impact on the political debate. In 
Germany, for example, the non-establishment Pirate Party obtained a sustainable position in the 
debate on social media (Jungherr, 2014a; Jungherr, Jürgens, & Schoen, 2012). In a similar manner, in 
the Netherlands, candidates of opposition parties were somewhat more active on Twitter and had a 
larger follower base (Vergeer, Hermans, & Sams, 2011).  
Besides studying Twitter as a separate platform, we are also interested in the extent to which Twitter 
affects the traditional media. Or, put differently, do Twitter activity and Twitter popularity have a real 
influence on who matters in the campaign? The ‘potentially powerful dynamic’ between mainstream 
and social media has been identified as an important research gap in the field (Enli & Moe, 2013: 
642). Some recent studies have provided insight into this relationship (e.g. Vargo, Guo, McCombs, & 
Shaw, 2014), but seldom these studies are related to the normalization versus equalization debate. 
An exception is Jungherr (2014) who examined the temporal interaction between Twitter messages 
and campaign coverage in the traditional media. He found very similar patterns of attention for the 
leading politicians on both platforms, but for other actors there was much more variation.  
To test whether the normalization or rather the equalization thesis is more plausible, we employ 
three indicators. For each indicator, we formulate a hypothesis in line with the normalization thesis 
and, conversely, one corresponding to the equalization thesis. Table 1 presents these competing 
hypotheses.  First, we look at the distribution of candidates on Twitter activity and Twitter popularity 
during the 2014 election campaign, compared to the distribution of candidates on traditional media. 
In the case of normalization, one would expect that like coverage in the traditional media, Twitter 
activity and popularity are unequally divided between candidates, with a small group of politicians 
being most active and most popular. On the other hand, if the opposite equalization hypothesis 
holds, we would find that compared to the traditional media, the distribution of Twitter activity and 
popularity are more equally distributed amongst candidates. Second, we distinguish between higher 
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and lower positioned candidates and look whether they differ in terms of Twitter activity and 
popularity. Being a high profile political candidate (meaning having a high ballot list position and 
good political experience) is an important predictor for media attention (Van Aelst et al., 2008). In 
the case of normalization, we would therefore find a similar pattern, with high profile candidates 
being the most active and popular. The equalization hypothesis, on the other hand, posits that 
Twitter offers new opportunities for the low profile candidates, meaning that lower and high profile 
candidates share a more equal degree of activity and popularity on Twitter. Third, we measure the 
effect of Twitter activity and popularity on traditional media attention. In the case of equalization, 
we would expect that Twitter offers opportunities for low profile candidates to get in the news. Thus, 
candidates who traditionally would not be covered in the news may get covered due to the fact that 
they are active and popular on Twitter. Under the normalization hypothesis on the other hand we 
expect that journalists only looks at the activity and popularity of the ‘usual suspects’ on Twitter.  
< insert Table 1 about here> 
Operationalizing Twitter activity and popularity 
In line with our hypotheses, we distinguish between Twitter activity and popularity. Twitter activity 
reflects politicians’ activity as senders of tweets, while popularity gives an indication of politicians’ 
success on the platform. Both popularity and activity are rooted in social media’s principle of 
datafication (van Dijck and Poell 2013). Datafication refers to the tracking and quantification of our 
online interactions, which in turn allows for their interpretation in a comparable manner. Since we 
are primarily interested in what happens during the election campaign, we study Twitter activity and 
popularity in the four weeks before Election Day. Also, the relationship between Twitter and 
traditional media attention is limited to this selected time-span. Therefore, we focus on temporal 
Twitter popularity measures, and not on a politicians’ follower counts, which can be considered as a 
form of long-standing popularity. Follower networks consist of a user’s subscribers accumulated over 
time, mostly long before the start of the campaign. The number of followers is a key determinant in 
the flow of information on Twitter, as it reflects the user’s primary audience (Bruns & Stieglitz, 2014). 
Often, famous politicians can reach a large crowd on Twitter, even without being particularly active 
or innovative users.  
 
Hence, focusing on the campaign dynamics, we operationalize politicians’ temporal popularity as 
comprising two of Twitter’s specific features, namely mentions and retweets. Mentions are part of 
the micro layer of communication on Twitter, reflecting interpersonal communication between users 
(Bruns & Moe, 2014). Using the “@username”-expression within a tweet, one can address specific 
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other users, regardless whether there exists a follower-followee connection or not. Mentions are 
both conversational, as well as referential markers. As a conversational marker, it can be used to join 
in the ‘chain of replies’ to another’s tweet. More specifically, replies are "@username"-expressions 
placed at the beginning of the message. However, for reasons of clarity, we use the label ‘mentions’ 
to refer to all "@username"-expressions. As a referential marker, they can be used to refer to 
another user, using his/her Twitter username (e.g. “I will vote for @politicianX tomorrow”) (Bruns & 
Moe, 2014; Honeycutt & Herring, 2009). In both cases, they make the user visible and are reflective 
of the user’s importance on the platform (Ausserhofer & Maireder, 2013). Retweets can be used by 
users to share, or reproduce, existing content, and thereby contribute to the visibility of other users 
(and their tweets) in the network. Incoming retweets are argued to reflect users’ role as sources of 
information (Bruns & Stieglitz, 2014). More than is the case with replies or mentions, retweets have 
the potential to go beyond the user’s follower network. Like retweets, favorites endorse particular 
messages, although this function is less documented in extant literature. Their meaning is 
ambivalent, as a favorite can not only be interpreted to signify agreement with the tweet, but it may 
also be used in other ways, for example as a bookmark. In sum, we argue that mentions (including 
replies) can be considered as an indicator of personal popularity, whereas retweets and favorites 
rather function as markers of message popularity. 
 
The popularity measures discussed above are related to politicians’ activity on the platform. More 
specifically, politicians have to send tweets in order for them to be retweeted and favorited. Witty 
and sharply formulated political tweets, for example, have a great potential of spreading around the 
network (Parmelee & Bichard, 2012). In addition, politicians can promote their candidacy and 
interact with citizens, journalists, and other politicians (e.g. Graham, Broersma, Hazelhoff, & van 't 
Haar, 2013). Here, we understand activity as the tweets that the candidates compose and post 
themselves – in other words, non-retweeted content (i.e. ‘regular’ tweets and replies to other users). 
With this restriction, we aim to focus on candidates’ original user activity.  
Research design 
To study the extent of normalization or equalization on Twitter and to investigate the relationship 
between Twitter and traditional media during the campaign, we rely on Twitter data from political 
candidates and their appearance in the newspapers in the advent of the 2014 elections in Belgium. 
Belgium is a proportional parliamentary democracy with a flexible list system. Consequently, not only 
political parties, but also individual candidates within these parties compete with each other for 
votes (Deschouwer, 2009). A higher number of preferential votes could help candidates to leapfrog 
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past their higher-ranked colleagues, thereby getting elected in parliament or obtain a better position 
in the next elections. In addition, preferential votes improve a (higher-ranked) candidates’ chances of 
obtaining an executive mandate for candidates. Therefore, it is important for political candidates in 
Belgium that not only their party gets covered in the media, but that they also receive media 
coverage themselves. 
On May 25, three elections were held simultaneously on different electoral levels (regional, federal 
and European). In the month before these elections (April 24 – May 24), data from Twitter and 
newspapers were collected. In addition, we conducted a candidate survey to gather data on other 
characteristics, such as age, gender, nationality, political mandates, and we combined these data 
with information about the ballot list position and party membership of each candidate. 
Our sample is restricted to the candidates that are electable in Flanders (the Dutch-speaking part of 
Belgium, reflecting 60% of the population in Belgium). In total, 955 of the 1519 Flemish politicians 
who participated in all three elections completed our survey. This means a response rate of 63% 
which is quite high for an expert survey. Also, chi-square tests show that this sample is fairly 
representative of the general population of candidates. Only with regard to party belonging, 
candidates of the green party are slightly overrepresented while candidates of the Far-right are 
slightly underrepresented. However, we do not expect this to bias our results. Of the 955 candidates 
who completed the survey, 492 had a Twitter account and we were able to retrieve in-depth Twitter 
data for 322 of them. These 322 candidates include both familiar candidates with high ballot list 
position and/or important executive functions, and unknown candidates, as well as an equal 
distribution between the different Flemish political parties. We will conduct our analyses on this 
sample of 322 candidates with a Twitter account.  
For the collection of the Twitter data we relied on the open-source tool yourTwapperkeeper which is 
commonly used within social sciences (for a detailed overview of this tool, see Bruns & Liang, 2012). 
For each candidate, an archive was set up which captured tweets from and to that particular user.
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As the Twitter API is the only entry point to the data, there is no base for comparison and therefore 
there are no guarantees for a comprehensive dataset (Highfield, Harrington, & Bruns, 2013).  
As stated earlier, we focus both on Twitter activity and Twitter popularity during the election 
campaign. A principal component analysis (Table 2) supports the existence of these two separate 
dimensions. Both the number of tweets and the number of replies sent, reflect the activity of the 
candidate on Twitter. The second dimension, popularity, is operationalized by combining the number 
of retweets, favorites, mentions and replies received. Combining these measures leads to a reliable 
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scale with a Cronbach’s alpha of .90. Correlating positively with these measures, the number of 
followers on Twitter might be included in the popularity scale. However, as explained before, we 
believe it is important to maintain Twitter followers as a separate variable as it allows a conceptual 
and empirical assessment of the temporal correspondence between Twitter popularity and mass 
media attention.  
< insert Table 2 about here > 
Attention in traditional media was captured using the Belgian Gopress database, which contains all 
Belgian newspapers. For each candidate we counted and checked the number of articles in which he 
or she was mentioned during the campaign (April 24 – May 24). We included all eight paid Flemish 
newspapers
2
 and the free daily Metro.  
After presenting some descriptives we run a number of regressions with temporal Twitter activity, 
Twitter popularity and media attention as dependent variable. As the distributions of these variables 
are very skewed we use natural logarithmic transformations. As controls we include a number of 
socio-demographic characteristics of the candidates such as gender, age and ethnicity. Moreover, we 
include certain traditional power indicators such as political incumbency (being a parliamentarian or 
Minister) and the position on the ballot list. We add extra dummies for the first and last candidates 
on the list, labelled respectively as the list puller and list pusher, as often these positions are 
occupied by party leaders (in the case of the first position) or other party figureheads (in the case of 
the last position). The reason to include these different indicators is that they are important 
predictors of receiving traditional media attention. Since Belgium has a system where parties 
determine the order of the ballot list position, they often put top candidates, for whom it is more 
easy to access the media, on the highest ballot list positions (Van Aelst et al, 2008). Also, incumbents 
are covered more frequently in the traditional media (Tresch, 2009; Wolfsfeld, 2011). Therefore, by 
including these variables in the regression we can test whether the group who is most popular on 
Twitter is similar to the group who gets covered most in the traditional media (normalization) or 
whether it is a different group of candidates which manages to become popular on Twitter 
(equalization). Finally, we add dummies for political parties, as well as dummies to account for 
whether candidates took part in the federal, Flemish or European election to account for the nested 
data structure.  
Table 3 summarizes the variables used in our model and provides descriptive statistics. The first 
section of variables reflects campaign attention in traditional media, activity and popularity on 
Twitter during the campaign, and the Twitter follower count by the start of the campaign. We notice 
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here that the standard deviations for these variables are very high, which indicates a lot of variety 
between the different candidates. The second section of variables contains socio-demographics and 
political background characteristics.  
< insert Table 3 about here > 
Results 
Before we investigate the relationship between the coverage in the traditional media and the new 
social media, it is useful to first look at these platforms separately. On average, candidates appear in 
eight newspaper articles (see Table 3). As the standard deviation (46.1) already suggests, the 
distribution is extremely skewed. Table 4 shows that close to 53% of the candidates did not receive 
any attention at all and 38% of the candidates were mentioned in 10 or fewer articles. In contrast, 
there is a very small group of candidates that were mentioned in more than 50 articles. For example, 
Bart de Wever, leader of the N-VA (Flemish nationalist party) which eventually won the elections, 
was covered in almost 800 articles in the timeframe of this research. Thus, during the election 
campaign, traditional media gave voice to a very select group of candidates, whereas the vast 
majority of the candidates received very little or no attention at all. From previous research we know 
that the distribution of television coverage is even more skewed in favor of the major candidates 
(Van Aelst et al., 2008).
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< insert Table 4 about here > 
In line with the equalization hypothesis, optimism has been uttered about the potential of social 
media to include more voices in the debate. In comparison to traditional media, virtually anyone can 
access Twitter and post their messages. Regardless about half of all Flemish candidates does not 
have a Twitter account. Concerning the political candidates that do have a Twitter account (N=323), 
there is great variation between activity, popularity and the number of followers the candidates 
have.  
Of the candidates with a Twitter account, 13% of them did not send any tweets in the weeks prior to 
the election. Another 29% of candidates sent fewer than ten tweets during the four week campaign 
period. Only about one out of ten candidates did send more than 100 tweets and can be considered 
as active users. Thus, in the light of the high percentage of candidates without a Twitter account, and 
considering that many of the candidates with an account barely sent tweets, we can conclude that a 
relatively small group has embraced the use of Twitter as a campaign tool.  
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When we look at Twitter popularity, we notice that only one candidate out of ten did not receive any 
attention on Twitter. This is very different from traditional media attention, as 53% of the candidates 
did not receive any attention in the newspaper. Thus, if a candidate has a Twitter account, it is very 
likely that one will receive at least some attention from other users in the form of replies, mentions, 
retweets or favorites. However, it seems that most of the candidates only received up to 100 
retweets, favorites, replies or mentions, and a very small number of candidates (about 7%) receives 
over a 1000 of these. For follower count, an indication of a candidate’s long-standing Twitter 
popularity, we notice similarities with temporal activity and popularity in the sense that most of the 
candidates have a limited number of followers and a small number of candidates have a lot of 
followers. As shown in Table 4, almost 44% of these candidates have fewer than 200 followers, while 
a small group of candidates (about 8%) has 5000 or more followers. The follower base of the ten 
leading politicians ranges between 13.000 and 47.000.  
To compare the distribution of how candidates use and perform on old and new media, Figure 1, 
presents the Lorentz curves of Twitter activity, popularity and media attention in newspapers. These 
curves show how these three variables are distributed in the sample of politicians. The x-axis depicts 
the percentage of politicians, while the y-axis depicts the percentage of media attention and tweets 
sent or received. Thus, if we focus on Twitter popularity, we notice that 80% of the politicians receive 
only 10% of Twitter popularity. The distribution would be fully equal if the curve has an angle of 45 
degrees. The more skewed this curve is, the more unequal the distribution. The three different 
curves show that all our three indicators are very skewed. However, compared to the other lines, 
Twitter activity is more equal than media attention and temporal Twitter popularity. When we 
perform a Kolmogorov-Smirnoff test we find that this difference is significant, meaning that in terms 
of Twitter use, we do find some support for the equalization hypothesis (H1). We also performed the 
K-S test to compare temporal popularity on Twitter and media attention. The test shows a significant 
difference. Yet, if we look at Figure 1, we see that although Twitter popularity is slightly more equally 
distributed than media attention, this difference is not substantial. In general, temporal popularity on 
Twitter follows the same pattern as media attention, meaning that for Twitter popularity we find 
more support for the normalization hypothesis (H2). 
While the descriptives and Lorenz curves show that Twitter does not create an equal playing field as 
only some candidates are active on the platform and as popularity is limited to a happy few, Twitter 
might still be equalizing in the sense that, unlike the traditional media, it does not reflect traditional 
political power relations. In other words, perhaps the candidates most active and popular on Twitter, 
are not the candidates with the highest political status. In order to test this, we run two separate 
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regressions with respectively Twitter activity (H3) and Twitter popularity (H4) as dependent variables. 
If there is equalization, we should find little or no influence of traditional power indicators such as 
ballot list position and political mandate. The first model in Table 5 takes Twitter activity as 
dependent variable. We see that especially the ballot list position predicts a candidate’s activity on 
Twitter. In general, candidates send more tweets if they hold a better position on the ballot. Note 
that there is an additional effect for being the first candidate on the list. We do not find any effect of 
incumbency, but this can be partly explained by the fact that the candidates who have a mandate 
often get the highest ballot list position. Being active on Twitter hardly differs between candidates of 
different parties, except for those from the smaller socialist party (PVDA), who traditionally rely more 
on canvassing and grassroots campaigning.  
Similar results are found for Twitter popularity (see Table 5). Model 1 shows that all indicators of 
better list position have an outspokenly positive effect on Twitter popularity. This means that the list 
position, as an indicator of the political status of the candidate, strongly influences success on 
Twitter. In this sense, Twitter popularity follows the same patterns of political power and it is difficult 
for lower ranked candidates to become popular on social media. However, in Model 2, the number of 
Twitter followers shows as a significant indicator of popularity on Twitter during the campaign, while 
list position loses some of its explanatory power. This suggests that candidates can partly ‘rise above’ 
their position on the list when they have been able to build an established follower base before the 
start of the campaign. Again, differences between parties are minimal. The fact that candidates of 
the Flemish nationalist party (N-VA) are relatively more popular on Twitter compared to others, can 
be attributed to the expected success (considering the polls) of the party in the election outcome. 
Also in the traditional media, the Flemish nationalist and their prominent position in the polls 
dominated the coverage
4
.  
When comparing the explained variance of the different regressions it is striking that we are much 
better to explain popularity compared to activity. This means that the indicators for influence of 
power have a significant yet limited impact on Twitter activity, while they are much more 
determining in the case of Twitter popularity. We thus find clear support for the normalization 
hypothesis for hypothesis 4 and to a smaller extent also for hypothesis 3. 
<insert Table 5 here> 
Based on the Lorenz curves and regression analyses we have to temper some of the optimism 
regarding the equal playfield of Twitter, as evidence points towards support for the normalization 
theory. This image is confirmed for all candidates when we run a number of regression analyses with 
13 
 
media attention as dependent variable and the Twitter measures as independent variables. The 
regression analysis enables us to control for other factors which potentially influence the relation 
between the traditional media and Twitter (e.g. socio-demographics and party membership). As our 
data are not longitudinal, and therefore we cannot know whether Twitter popularity influences 
media attention or vice versa, we do not claim to make any causal inferences based on these 
regression models with media attention during the campaign as the dependent variable.  
< insert Table 6 about here > 
Table 6 presents the impact of Twitter activity, popularity and followers on media attention. 
Stepwise, the different controlling variables were included to define alterations in the impact of the 
Twitter measures on media attention. Model 1 regresses media attention on temporal Twitter 
activity and popularity and the amount of followers. We add dummies for the political parties and 
the type of election, to account for the nested data structure (not presented in table).  Candidates 
who generate more Twitter popularity during the elections also receive more attention in the media. 
We reach a similar conclusion if we look at the number of followers. Those candidates who have built 
a large follower base are also the ones that attract most media attention. We find a negative 
relationship for activity. Thus, candidates who are more active do not become more popular in the 
media. On the contrary, being active on Twitter and receiving media attention are negatively related. 
Of course, the  direction of this relationship remains unclear as candidates who receive most media 
attention might have less incentive to actively tweet, while candidates that get very little attention in 
might be more active on Twitter to compensate for their lack of visibility in the mainstream media. 
Nevertheless, it gives support to the normalization hypothesis in relation to H5.  
Model 2 shows that, when controlling for socio-demographics, the relation between the independent 
and the dependent variables changes very little. Hence, the positive impact of Twitter popularity on 
media attention during the campaign still holds. However, it is plausible that leading candidates 
explain the relation between Twitter popularity and media attention and fully drive the previous 
models. Therefore, in our final model, we add list position, dummies for the list puller and the list 
pusher and a dummy for political mandate. Indeed, in Model 3, we notice that the effect of temporal 
Twitter popularity on media attention disappears once we control for list position and one’s 
mandates. This indicates that the relationship between popularity in the traditional and in the new 
media exists primarily because a small political elite (mainly party leaders and ministers), receive 
most of the media coverage and are also the most popular politicians on Twitter. With regard to the 
hypotheses this means that we find support  for the normalization hypothesis (H6). However, the 
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number of followers, or long-standing Twitter popularity, remains a significant indicator of media 
attention. We will come back to this finding in the conclusion.  
Finally, we notice that when comparing the models in Table 6 and Table 5, we find that older 
candidates get more attention in the traditional news media (see Table 6), while younger candidates 
score significantly better in terms of Twitter popularity (see Table 5). This indicates that for younger 
politicians Twitter might be more relevant, or at least that using Twitter is more integrated in their 
personal campaign. With caution, we can read this finding as a sign that things may change in the 
future. 
Conclusion and discussion 
Over the years election campaigns have become more complex and multi-dimensional. New, mainly 
digital, media have entered the electoral arena, but the traditional media have maintained a central 
place in the campaign. Although campaign studies have devoted much attention to the use and 
effects of new social media, their relationship with the traditional media has remained 
underexplored. This study aimed to get a better idea of how old and new media go together by 
studying a large number of individual candidates. Overall, we cannot claim  that during the campaign 
popularity on Twitter leads to more newspaper articles or vice versa. However, the two platforms are 
closely related: candidates who have a prominent position in the media are generally also the ones 
who are more popular on Twitter. This is not so much because more mentions or replies translate 
directly into a higher coverage in the traditional media, but mainly because a small political elite of 
predominantly party leaders and ministers is successful on both platforms. This elite receives almost 
all news coverage and at the same time is most successful in having impact with the tweets they 
send and generating some buzz. At the same time, we found that being more active on Twitter does 
not influence one’s media attention. While candidates may employ Twitter as a way to get in the 
newspaper, our results suggest that in general this is not a successful strategy, especially if one is not 
part of the political elite. The young politician who is able to get media attention via successful 
tweeting seems to be the exception rather than the rule
5
. In this respect, our findings fit the 
normalization hypothesis.  
As for now, opportunities for less prominent political candidates to get media attention via Twitter 
are very limited. From the perspective of an ordinary candidate these results are not very 
encouraging. Campaigns are still run via the mass media, in which a limited number of candidates 
appear in the spotlights. Even though commenters have been optimistic about the new opportunities 
Twitter may offer, enabling alternative candidates to be heard, our study shows that we should tone 
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down these expectations, at least for now. The normalization thesis even holds when we discard 
traditional media and look at Twitter only. Higher ranked political candidates dominate in terms of 
Twitter popularity, and are also more active on Twitter than lower ranked politicians. However, these 
political status measures explained only a limited amount of the variance in Twitter activity, which 
indicates that there are also ordinary candidates among the top Twitter users. It is the only 
hypothesis (H1) that is somewhat in line with the equalization thesis, while the five other hypotheses 
rather support the normalization thesis. In addition, also a politicians’ follower base serves as a 
relevant explanatory variable that might provide opportunities for ordinary politicians. Long-term 
success on the platform is significantly related to media attention, whereas temporal Twitter 
popularity does not improve media attention.  
How can we explain these rather conservative findings? We believe there at least some reasons to 
assume that the equalizing power of Twitter is somewhat larger in other countries and for other time 
periods. First, it seems that Belgium is not an early adaptor when it comes to microblogging. The 
adoption rate of Twitter in Belgium (Flanders),which is less than 20%, lags behind that other social 
media platforms, such as Facebook (63%).
6
 In comparison, the Netherlands, where up to 27% of the 
population uses Twitter (Comscore, 2011) is amongst the top countries concerning active Twitter use 
(Semiocast, 2012). This might also explain why a majority of Dutch politicians is very active on Twitter 
(Graham, Jackson, & Broersma, 2014; Spierings & Jacobs, 2014), while in Belgium the majority of 
candidates is not (yet) making use of this social medium. Second, an election campaign might not be 
the most obvious event to expect a more diverse representation of political actors. Several studies in 
political communication have shown that the dynamics between media and politics are different in 
campaign periods compared to routine periods. For instance, in election times the media seldom 
introduce a new issue on the agenda as all political parties and major candidates are more active 
than ever (Walgrave & Van Aelst, 2006). Furthermore, election periods are well announced in 
advance and news outlets carefully plan how to cover them, leaving little room for innovation or 
unexpected news. As Jungherr (2014a: 254) notes in his study on Twitter and traditional media 
coverage, campaigns are ‘highly structured and ritualized’. For this reason, he expects that ‘non-
traditional actors rise to greater prominence during other times’. In addition, an election campaign 
might also be too short for candidates to become an important player on social media and boost 
one’s presence in the traditional media. In that sense, our finding that the amount of followers on 
Twitter contributed significantly to explain media attention is important. It indicates that politicians 
need to invest in building a larger follower base outside election time. Perhaps journalists value this 
long-term form of popularity more compared to the short-term success of a few popular tweets 
during the campaign.  
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To conclude, further research is needed to validate our findings in other countries and outside 
campaign periods. Next, we need to deepen our understanding of the mechanisms behind the 
interaction between old and new media. In particular, three streams of research seem necessary to 
develop further. First, we need to know more on how journalists use social media as a source of 
political information in their daily job and how activities of politicians influence their perceptions on 
the newsworthiness of these actors. Second, also looking more in-depth to those candidates and 
tweets that are successful in making it into the news could improve our understanding of the 
interrelatedness of traditional and new forms of political communication. Finally, it would be useful 
to consider the effects of Twitter on the election results. Although Twitter activity does not generate 
more traditional media attention, it might still be a useful strategy for ordinary candidates if it leads 
to more preferential votes. When studying different sorts of impact of Twitter this study at least 
showed that it is important to distinguish between different aspects of social media use by 
politicians.  
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Figures and Tables 
Table 1: Competing hypothesis on the normalizing or equalizing role of Twitter in the election 
campaign  
 Normalization Equalization 
H1: distribution of Twitter 
activity 
… as unequal as mass media 
attention 
… more equal than mass media 
attention 
H2: distribution of Twitter 
popularity 
… as unequal as mass media 
attention 
… more equal than mass media 
attention 
H3: Higher profile candidates 
have a  
… higher degree of Twitter 
activity 
… equal/lower degree of 
Twitter activity  
H4: Higher profile candidates 
have a  
… higher degree of Twitter 
popularity 
… equal/lower degree of 
Twitter popularity  
H5: Twitter activity does … … NOT lead to more media 
attention 
… lead to more media attention 
H6: Twitter popularity does … … NOT lead to more media 
attention 
… lead to more media attention 
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Table 2: The factor loadings of the different Twitter metrics (Varimax rotated) 
 Component 1 
(Activity) 
Component 2 
(Temporal 
popularity) 
Tweets sent 
 
    .873 .338 
Replies sent 
 
    .962 .056 
Retweets 
received 
 
    .124 .961 
Favorites 
received 
 
    .237 .931 
Replies received 
 
    .348 .905 
Mentions 
received 
    .083 .927 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics of variables used in analysis  
Variable name Mean (S.E) Freq (%) 
Media attention       8.27(46.1)  
Twitter activity     20.73(57.7)  
Twitter popularity   255.06(768.9)  
- Personal popularity   112.63(333.4)  
- Message popularity   142.43(459.1)  
Follower count  1581.76(4461.0)  
Age     42.98(11.9)  
Gender   
- Male       345(55.2%) 
- Female  280(44.8%) 
Political mandate   
- Yes  204(32.6%) 
- No  421(67.4%) 
Ethnic origin   
- Belgian or European  584(93.4%) 
- Non-European     41(6.6%) 
Election level   
- Regional  328(52.5%) 
- Federal  272(43.5%) 
- European    25(4.0%) 
Political party   
- Flemish regionalists    90(14.4%) 
- Christian Democrats    90(14.4%) 
- Green Party  122(19.5%) 
- Social Democrats    89(14.2%) 
- Far-Right party    58  (9.3%) 
- Liberal party    91(14.6%) 
- Socialists    85(13.6%) 
 
 
 
Table 4: Media attention, Twitter activity, Twitter popularity and Follower count (N=323). 
Newspaper 
articles 
% Candidates Activity % 
Candidates 
Popularity % 
Candidates 
Follower 
count 
% 
Candidates 
0 52.8% 0 13.3% 0 9.6% 0-100 25.4% 
1-10 38.2% 1-10 29.4% 1-100 63.2% 101-200 18.3% 
11-20 3.4% 11-20 14.9% 101-250 9.9% 201-500 23.4% 
21-50 1.9% 21-50 19.5% 251-500 6.8% 500-1000 10.5% 
51-100 2.1% 51-100 12.8% 501-1000 3.4% 1001-2500 8.3% 
>100 1.6% >100 10.2% >1000 7.1% 2501-5000 6.2% 
      >5000 8.0% 
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Table 5: OLS regressions with Twitter activity and Twitter popularity as dependent variables.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*p<.05; **p<.01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Twitter activity (log) Twitter popularity (log) 
 Model 1 
b(SE) 
Model 1 
b(SE) 
Model 2 
b(SE) 
Male .295(.34)    .251(.33)    .045(.18) 
Age -.032(.02)   -.060(.02)**   -.033(.01)** 
Non-European 
background 
.188(.75)   -.143(.72)   -.642(.39) 
    
Political mandate -.279(.38)    .035(.36)    .071(.20) 
List position .049(.02)*    .106(.02)**    .041(.01)** 
First on the list 1.599(.53)**  3.406(.51)**    .696(.32)* 
Last on the list .364(.72)  2.377(.69)**    .753(.40) 
    
Activity (log)      .564(.04)** 
Follower count      .710(.07)** 
    
Political party (ref. 
Christian Democrats) 
   
- Flemish 
regionalists 
-.168(.53)     .603(.51)    .768(.28)** 
- Green Party -.608(.56) -1.073(.53)*  -.412(.29) 
- Social 
Democrats 
-.939(.57)   -.739(.55)  -.013(.30) 
- Far-Right 
party 
-.579(.76) -1.109(.72)  -.373(.39) 
- Liberal party -.477(.56)   -.072(.53)    .140(.29) 
- Socialists -2.593(.88)** -2.750(.84)**  -.328(.47) 
    
Electoral level (ref. 
Flemish) 
   
- Federal -.212(.33)   -.180(.31)   .105(.17) 
- European 1.536(1.038)  1.942(.99)   .721(.54) 
    
Constant 3.896(.83)**   5.999(.79)**   -.778(.59) 
N 322 322          322 
R² .063         .264         .783 
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*p<.05; **p<.01 
 
  
Table 6: OLS regressions with the logged media as dependent variable.  
Media coverage (log) 
 
Model 1 
b(SE) 
Model 2 
b(SE) 
Model 3 
b(SE) 
Twitter activity (log)    -.208(.06)**    -.210(.06)*   -.109(.05)* 
Temporal Twitter popularity (log)     .166(.07)*     .206(.07)**    .094(.06) 
Follower count (log)     .770(.09)**     .696(.09)**    .441(.09)** 
    
Male     .274(.21)    .275(.19) 
Age     .032(.01)**    .015(.01)** 
Non-European background    -.217(.46)  -.008(.43) 
    
Political mandate      .206(.22) 
List position      .057(.01)** 
List puller    1.283(.43)** 
List pusher    1.922(.35)** 
    
Political party (ref. Christian 
Democrats) 
   
- Flemish regionalists   -.514(.33)   -.576(.32)   -.282(.30) 
- Green Party   -.600(.33)   -.570(.33)   -.610(.32) 
- Social Democrats   -.139(.35)   -.048(.35)   -.005(.32) 
¤ Far-Right party   -.843(.44)   -.656(.44)   -.866(.43)* 
- Liberal party   -.414(.34)   -.424(.34)   -.197(.31) 
- Socialists -1.086(.52)* -1.044(.51)* -1.468(.50)** 
    
Electoral level (ref. Flemish)    
- Federal   -.028(.20)    .004(.20)   -.215(.18) 
- European    .358(.64)    .269(.63)    .430(.59) 
    
N 322 322 322 
R² .420 .446 .531 
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Figure 1: Lorenz curves of Twitter popularity, Twitter activity and mass media attention 
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1
 yourTwapperkeeper  (Available at: http://github.com/jobrieniii/yourTwapperKeeper) is based on 
the Twitter streaming API, through which keywords can be “tracked”. Aside the “track” parameter 
(which captures activity to a particular user), we also included the “follow” parameter to get Twitter 
activity from that particular user (For more information: https://dev.twitter.com/docs/streaming-
apis/parameters#follow). 
2
 These newspapers are the broadsheets  De Morgen, De Standaard and De Tijd, the popular papers 
Het Laatste Nieuws and Het Nieuwsblad, and the more regional oriented papers Het Belang van 
Limburg, de krant van West-Vlaanderen and De Gazet van Antwerpen.  
3
 In the 2014 campaign only 7% of the candidates appeared at least once in one of the major 
television news broadcasts during the campaign. Therefore, we decided to focus on newspaper data 
only. 
4
 According to the Flemish Newsmonitor the Flemish nationalists (N-VA) accounted for 36% of all 
mentions of parties and candidates in both newspapers and television news broadcasts 
 
5
 For instance, Kristof Calvo, a young MP of the Green party, was able to score the third place on the 
Twitter Popularity index without being very present in the traditional media. Another relative young 
politician, Alexander De Croo, Minister for the liberal party, stated in an interview that his steep 
political career was pushed by his success on twitter. De Croo has by far the most followers of all 
Belgian politicians. 
6
 iMinds-iLab.o (2013) Digimeter Report 6. Adoption and usage of Media & ICT in Flanders. Ghent: 
iMinds-iLab.o. 
